Dr.B.J. Campbell has 'beenDirectorofthe University ofNorth Carolina Highway Safety Research Center
since it was established in 1966.
He has served as member and chairman ofnational
committees for the Trans_portation Research Board and
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Dr. Campbell received the Volvo Traffic Safety Award
in 1988 and TRB's Roy Crum Award for distinguished
research in 1989.
He earned his Ph.D. in Experimental Psychology
from the University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill.

OPENING SESSION
Thursday, October 19, 1989
Dr. B. J. Campbell
Director
Highway Safety Research Center
University of North Carolina

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Thank you for letting me be here. I'm glad safety is the theme of your
Forum.
It's obligatory in speeches like this to recite a few of the grim statistics,
but mostly my talk is going to be upbeat.
We are losing a great deal of what is valuable to our society by virtue of
highway accidents. These accidents produce about 130 deaths a day, 47,000 a
year. There are several million injuries per year; it depends on how you count
the injuries-some where around two to four million people. In non-war time,
such as we enjoy now, the biggest single source of paralyzing injuries is highway accidents. And, of course, aside from the ruined lives and the agonizing
readjustments survivors must endure, these crashes are a great cost to
victims, their families, and to society as a whole. It's a huge sum (some
estimates are $10 billion, some $50 billion). It represents a very significant
part of our tax dollars and of our health-care dollars.
On the other hand, I think we have done pretty well over the years if you
compare our highway safety situation today with that of 1925. We currently
have a death rate, per 100 million vehicle miles, that is about one-seventh as
large now as it was in 1925. If we were still having fatalities at the same rate
today as we had in 1925, we would be killing about 320,000 to 330,000 people
a year instead of 45,000. We have improved a startling amount when you
compare that period of time.
Even though we have very large numbers of casualties, the individual
events are very improbable. As a matter of fact, if you look at the number of
miles of travel for each fatality and translate that to individual driving, it is
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pretty impressive. Surveys indicate that the average person drives
approxim ately 10,000 or 11,000 miles a year. If you consider how many years
you would have to drive at 11,000 miles a year to build up enough miles to be
the statistical equivalen t of one fatality, you would've had to get the old car
out at 2000 B.C. and cruise around in Egypt during the Ptolemaic period of
the pharaohs, work your way on up into Greece during the Age of Pericles,
fool around there for a few hundred years, on to Europe during the middle
ages, over to the coast to catch William the Conqueror as he invaded
England, work your way around there for a few hundred years, come west to
the New World-a nd even today you would still have a good many years of
driving (at 11,000 miles a year) to build up enough miles to match the statistical exposure equivalen t of one fatality-a bout 4,000 years of driving. That
tells us it's pretty safe and it's pretty difficult to make substanti al improvements because we would have to take an already low-probability event and
reduce the probability even further.
With regard to traffic safety, the USA is pretty well ahead of almost
every other country on earth. In fact, up until about 10 years ago our death
rate, taking into account miles driven, was well ahead of any other nation.
Now a few other nations have pretty much caught up with us. Australia , for
example, is getting in the same range as us, partially because of the success
of their seat belt laws and their dramatic initiatives in respect to drunk
driving. Still, we are ahead of most other countries. They're on somewha t the
same improvem ent curve as we are but, in general, they're several years,
even several decades, behind us.
At this time, three countries are in the ''big leagues" with respect to
traffic casualties . The United States, China, and Russia are three nations in
which the annual fatality toll is upwards of 50,000 per year. However, what
is very dramatic about that is that in China they manage to kill nearly
50,000 people a year with only one-twentieth the number of motor vehicles
we have in this country. In Russia, they create the 50,000 fatalities with onefourth to one-fifth as many vehicles.
If you assume that those vehicles have exposure patterns similar to our
own, it would indicate the death rate in China per unit exposure is of the
order of 20 times as high as it is in the U.S. If you multiply our own
experience by 20, that is upward of a million deaths per year. In South
Korea, the death rate appears to be around 12 times as high per unit ·
exposure as it is in this country. That gives you some picture of how far
ahead we are, how much more safety we enjoy per unit exposure in the
United States than in some of the countries around the world that are
motorizing at this point.
In a lot of developing countries, the nature of the problem is quite
different from ours. In the U.S., vehicle occupants account for a big category
of our deaths. In the last 20 years in particular , the USA has devoted a lot of
attention to making the interior of cars safer through occupant restraints
energy absorbing materials , etc. But, in many other countries the exterio; of
the vehicle accounts for more casualties because in such other countries
pedestria ns and bicyclists are the major victims.
In China, for example, only about five percent of fatalities are vehicle
occupants. The biggest category (50 percent or more) are pedestria ns or
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bicyclists. So, the exterior of the car rather than the interior is a greater
instrument of fatalities in much of the rest of the world.
Road-user behavior is quite different in some countries that are motorizing rather rapidly. Road-user behavior is perhaps worse than we had even
back in the 1930s. One of the things noteworthy in rural China is that many
drivers don't use headlights after dark-they only use parking lights and
flick the headlights on every few seconds to scan what is in front of them.
Most of what is in front of them is bicycles, painted black and without reflectors.
Many situations in these developing countries reflect the fact that they
don't have very much money to throw at the problem. (By the way-and this
is a subject of another speech-I think one of the things we really need is a
systematic transfer of highway safety knowledge from highly motorized
countries of Europe, North America, Australia, and Japan to the motorizing
nations like China, India, Ethiopia, and other nations.) These nations are
relatively poor and can't throw a lot of money into the problem. There are,
however, some relatively low-cost, highly effective initiatives that could be
made available, to permit these countries to jump ahead on the curve.
In contrast to many foreign countries, one notices how well-behaved
American drivers are. I think drivers in the United States are probably more
disciplined than in almost any other place on earth. There are a few places
where it is not much different-in Canada, for instance, and a few other
places.
Thus, for 60 years, the USA has been going through this act of balancing
the mobility that our system brings us and that we need with the safety
requirements of operating that system.
I want to talk for a few minutes (in a semi light-hearted way) about some
of the approaches our country has used over the last half century. I want to
tie that in to some of the prevailing political philosophies that have existed
during that time. I'll start off by stating a couple of assumptions, which you
may or may not accept.
It seems to me that we have in most areas of American life a sort of
creative tension between political conservatives and political liberals as it
applies to highway safety. I'm proceeding on the assumption that in this
country highway safety had its origins in a fairly politically conservative
environment. That grows out ofmy assumption that, police professionals,
highway engineers, and auto industry executives were the primary decision
makers in the early days of highway safety in the USA, and that people in
these groups more often tend to be politically conservative. I'm further
assuming that in the more recent years there has been a touch of political
liberalism in our highway safety movement that stems from involvement of
public health professionals and consumer advocates. My assumption is that
members of these latter groups tend to be more politically liberal.
Those are my basic assumptions. In this country, for the most part, highway safety originated within'the ranks ofroadway engineers and police. They
had the responsibility for the transportation system and its safe operation.
I think their political philosophy has influenced our programs. That is
perfectly natural. One does what one is comfortable with, and that tends to
grow out of one's own basic philosophy.
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There are some differences between these approache s and some of them
are amusing. For example, I've noticed that liberals don't like to use the word
"accident," they like to use the word "crash." More conservative people
perhaps are content to use the word accident. Liberals want to use the word
crash because if you use the word accident you will think it's a random event
and you can't do anything about them.
Among people with a more conservative philosophy, there is an approach
to highway safety that perhaps more emphasiz es individua l responsibility. In
this view the accident problem is regarded as being largely an outgrowth of
illegal or reprehens ible behavior on the part of road users. They tend to shy
away from approachi ng the problem through the instrumen talities of society,
such as governme nt regulation of corporations or by passive devices like
airbags and energy-absorbing guardrail s and so forth.
In contrast, it seems to me that the people with more liberal philosophy
like to stay away from dealing with the individual. They tend to look to
governme nt regulation of the automobile industry and governme nt responsibility in dealing with the instrumen talities of society, and they embrace the
governme nt control of industry, particular ly the auto industry. So, they favor
airbags, etc.
Each of those two approaches also has a theory of human behavior. In the
earlier days, when there was a predomin ant influence of conservative
elements, the watchword (with respect to human behavior) dealt with the
"nut-behind-the-wheel," or "get the bad driver off the road." This implied that
somehow, we can achieve highway safety ifwe can just identify the people
who are "nuts" or who are reprehens ible or bad guys causing all the
problems. Then we can either do something for them or to them and we will
achieve highway safety. That's the behavior theory I associate with the conservative side.
The liberal side also has a behavior theory and their catch phrase is
"education doesn't work." Liberals are fond of telling you that studies of
driver education, for example, fail to prove that driver education reduces
crashes at all. (That's true, that is what the research shows). They will go on
to say that you can't really do anything about human behavior and, therefore,
we need automatic things to protect the people because we can't do it through
changing attitudes or behavior. We need to do it, they say, through air bags
and automatic seat belts and breakawa y poles and energy-absorbing
guardrail s and that sort of thing.
I don't think either of those are very good behaviora l theories. Rather, I
think they're both political catch phrases. The political catch phrase calling
for dealing with the nut-behind-the-wheel theory is designed to focus attention on errant drivers and to put the resources of society in that direction, so
we don't have to interfer with the car industry and can build roads like we
want, etc.
On the other side, the political purpose of the catch phrase that "education doesn't work" is to counter the previous notion so that we don't spend all
our time trying to change drivers. Instead, we do things to improve car safety
and to make highways more crash worthy.
The failure of this nut-behind-the-wheel theory was shown in the literature as early as the 1930s by an author named Forbes. He showed that if
everybody in an entire state, in one year, with even one traffic ticket were
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locked up for a year to get them off the roads, you would actually get rid of
only about 3-5 percent of the accidents the next year. That is because of the
way accidents and violations are distribute d in the population. The repeater
accounts for a relatively small proportion of the total. So, even if you identify
these reprehens ible few and confine them, you still don't wipe out the problem, because most of those who have accidents the next year are having an
accident for the first time.
So, while there is some utility in dealing with accident repeaters, it
certainly does not make the kind of inroads on the problem that the catch
phrase would indicate. That 1930s research, by the way, was replicated in
the 1960s in California, and again in the 1970s in North Carolina.
On the other hand, I think the liberals' catch phrase that "education
doesn't work" is equally questionable as a behavior theory. It's more of a
political theory. As a matter fact, I was a member of the delegation that went
to China and was with a bunch of injury control specialists. As we were
riding on the bus, we were talking back and forth and most everybody was
agreeing that "education doesn't work," that you can't achieve highway safety
by changing human behavior. Then everyone got off that bus, walked around
its front and, as they were saying education doesn't work, each one looked to
the left, looked to the right, looked to the left again, and walked on across.
Everyone of them did that.
I happened to be last one off the bus, so I asked, "You say education
doesn't work, why did you look to the left and right? Were you born knowing
how to do that? Does that 'looking' behavior have value? Did you learn that
behavior?"
It is interestin g to note, both of these two "theories" of human behavior
are fairly authorita rian in nature. If you follow the conservative reasoning of
get-the-nut-off-the-road theory, that means you bring the force of governme nt
to bear on these 'bad guys" and you deprive them of somethin g-take the
license away, make him go to school, etc. It's somewha t the same with the
liberal theory, because the kind of programs liberals embrace are fairly
authorita rian too, but they intend to deal with whole groups of people. For
example, the more nearly liberal spokesmen are in favor of raising the drinking age from 18 to 21. In this you take something away from a whole class of
people. The idea seems to be that if we can't figure out which individual is
going to drink irresponsibly, let's raise the drinking age from the whole class.
That's also a fairly authorita rian thing to do.
So you get these tensions- on one hand the conservatives emphasiz e
voluntary use of seat belts, and on the other hand the liberals advocate air
bags. In fact, just the day before yesterday, I was testifying before a Senate
committee and one of the senators, a conservative Republican, was asking
the witnesses if it wouldn't be more appealing and effective if we could just
persuade people to wear seat belts rather than to pass seat belt laws.
Obviously, it appealed to him to avoid the use of government force to try to
achieve belt usage. Other senators at the same table were saying it would be
more appealing but it hasn't worked anywhere. Nowhere in the United States
have we ever been able to increase seat belt usage through voluntary
education al programs; not even one such program has been as good as every
state has achieved when they passed a seat belt law. Every state that has
passed a seat belt law has experienced at least a doubling (usually a tripling)
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now have levels of professional training that routinely take into account the
balancing of safety and mobility in ways that were not so 25 or 30 years ago.
We have a range of people that we didn't have 30 years ago interested in and
working on the problem.
We have improveme nts in the treatment of the injured at trauma
centers, improveme nts in the removal of the injured from an accident site.
We have a lot of people interested in the problem, working on the problem,
and there are resources that were not available in the past. Therefore, rm
fairly confident that progress will continue to bring the death rate down. But
it isn't going to be easy because we've already done the easy things. The last
30 years have seen many important improvements, but there are still lots of
things to be done, some of them politically feasible and some not.
One of the things we don't do in this country for example is random
breath testing for alcohol. In Australia, in the state of New South Wales
(where Sydney is located), police are authorized to do a quick prescreenin g
alcohol test with anybody anytime. They do millions of these tests each year.
Your probability of being stopped and asked to blow into the tube is about
one in three per year. We can't do that in this country. It's illegal, and I don't
think there is political interest in making it legal. But, they do it in
Australia and have reduced drunk driving very significantly.
Along with their two major initiatives (the dramatic initiatives that affect
alcohol abuse and the great success of their seat belt laws), Australia has
basically caught up with the USA in terms of the 100-million-mile death rate.
I use that example because we know that while we have this hopefully
creative tension between liberal and conservative views of the problem, we,
nevertheles s, have some things that we're willing to do in the name of safety
and some things that we are not willing to do.
I'm fairly optimistic. I think we have the institutions in place and the
dedicated professionals. I don't expect to see 65,000 and 85,000 fatalities per
year in this country. I don't say we're going to hold the line, but I do think
that we will be able to continue with counter measures to insure that our
highways continue to be the safest in the world. Thank you.

Questwn:
Are you saying the gridlock that we're experiencing right now is a flux?
Answer:
In a teasing sense, gridlock is the best thing for highway safety. If you
can't move, you can't have a bad crash. We once did a regression analysis of
the death rates in all 50 states for all the census periods since the 1930s. We
found that about half of the variance of the improved death rates that we
have experienced over the last 50 years are associated with the degree of
urbanizatio n. In a place like Connecticut, there are fewer places you can
drive fast enough to kill yourself. I don't think there's any doubt the more
rural states (like North Carolina and Kentucky) have a tougher time if you
use fatalities as a criterion.
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Question:
What about the age question. At the turn of the century , one out of six
to
people will be 65 or older. Do you have any backgro und on these drivers as
ties?
the basis offatali
Answer:
If I could show you a graph where the line across the bottom was age and
up the side was acciden t rates, the curve would be "U" shaped. The
line
the
rate is very high for the young, plunges dramat ically and bottom s out at
is
about 50 or 55 years old, and then begins to climb slightly after that. That
the sole advanta ge of middle age that I can tell!
I think the one thing that is changin g in this age group is the increas ed
use of cars by people who are a great deal older than 65. But the elderly tend
to self-limit a great deal by not driving as many miles and not driving aty
night. So, on a whole-n umber basis (a raw frequency basis) they probabl
correct their increas ed rates.
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